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1. Introduction
We investigate the question of the heterogeneity of preferences from the point
of view of revealed preference analysis. Specifically, we propose the revealed differ-
ent relation to study differences in preferences in a completely nonparametric way.
Two individuals are said to be revealed different if their joint decisions are more dis-
tant from rationality than either of their individual decisions taken separately. We
can use the revealed different relation to answer the question of how heterogeneous
preferences are within a group and which groups are more heterogeneous. Our ap-
proach can be extended to allow alternative and/or stricter versions of rationality,
which allows us to evaluate the cost of different behavioral assumptions in detecting
heterogeneity.
Our definition allows a comparison between individuals who themselves violate
rationality. This is a necessary requirement since most individual data are not per-
fectly consistent with rationality. In our analysis, we use the preexisting level of
rationality of the individuals being compared as a reference point. This construction
allows us to define a revealed different relation which is complete and symmetric
yet not transitive. We also discuss alternative approaches whereby two individuals
are not comparable. The normalization we use is motivated by the observation that
the joint decisions of two perfectly rational agents cannot be more rational than the
decisions taken separately.
The revealed different relation can be used to evaluate the level of heterogeneity
in a set of data. For instance, Pattanaik and Xu (2000) use the complementary
similarity relation to characterize freedom of choice across sets of alternatives. This
relation allows the comparison of sets of alternatives in terms of how many different
options they provide. The authors suggest using the smallest partition of the simi-
larity relation as a measure of freedom of choice. Because the similarity relation is
complementary to the revealed different relation, the methodology we use to elicit the
amount of types in the data corresponds to Pattanaik and Xu’s (2000) methodology.
Preference types are defined by two conditions. First, no two members of the same
preference type are revealed different from each other. Second, for any two different
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preference types, there is at least one pair containing one person belonging to each
type such that they are revealed different from each other. While the assignment
of people to preference types is not unique, the cardinality of the smallest partition
of people into preference types is always well-defined. We use this number as our
measure of heterogeneity of preferences.
In order to evaluate the empirical content of the revealed different relation, some
assumptions about how to measure distance from rationality are needed. In this
paper we use three measures of distance from rationality: Afriat’s (1973) critical
cost efficiency index (CCEI), Echenique et al.’s (2011) money pump index (MPI)
and Houtman and Maks (1985) index (HMI). The CCEI is appealing because it is
monotone in the number of decisions a subject makes. The CCEI never decreases
as more decisions are observed. Since the CCEI is bounded between 0 and 1, this
implies that the CCEI will converge to its true value as more data are collected,
which allows us to assess the extent to which our results are due to sampling error
or true differences in preferences. Monotonicity is not a common property among
measures of distance from rationality. The MPI and the HMI, are not monotone
measures and provide a natural contrast to the CCEI.
Our approach to gathering data is to use a random sample of the Dutch pop-
ulation whose preferences regarding risky assets were elicited using experimental
methods in Choi et al. (2014). In that study, participants were presented with 25
randomly generated budgets containing two assets that obtained with equal proba-
bility. By defining the revealed different relation based on the Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preferences (GARP), we find that the 1,182 individuals in the sample
can be partitioned into 131 different preference types. The preference types have an
average of 8.03 (s.d. 3.88) members, with the largest type containing 20 subjects and
the smallest type containing a single individual. These results are comparable using
the MPI to measure distance from rationality instead of the CCEI. In this case, the
number of preference types is 101.
As discussed above, the revealed different relation can be used to assess differences
in heterogeneity across populations and to test the cost for measured heterogeneity
of additional behavioral assumptions on preferences. Regarding differences across
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populations, we find evidence that men’s preferences are more heterogeneous than
women’s preferences, i.e., there are preference types among men that are not found
among women.1 These results are robust. In an appendix we show that the reported
gender differences in heterogeneity reproduce in a data set using different goods and
a different population. This gives us confidence of the ability of nonparametrically
identify differences across groups. We also show that the ability to detect differences
across groups depends on the number of assumptions imposed on the preference
relation. Imposing assumptions on preference relations not supported by the data
significantly reduces the estimated number of types.
To measure the extent to which differences in individual preferences are due to
differences in individual characteristics, we conduct a regression analysis of the re-
vealed different relation as a function of the differences in demographic variables and
individual fixed effects of the individuals being compared. We find that individ-
ual differences explain around 33 (max 53 percent) (according to logit regressions)
percent of the variance of the revealed different relation. Including observable char-
acteristics (sex, education, and income level) of the pair adds little to the proportion
of the variance explained. This suggests that differences in preferences, regardless
of being correlated, are largely driven by factors other than differences in individual
characteristics.
We are not the first to suggest using revealed preference analysis to identify het-
erogeneity in preferences. For example, Gross (1995) proposed testing for GARP
using cross-sectional data as a way to test for the commonality of preferences. As
another example, Heufer (2014) offered a nonparametric way to classify people based
on their level of risk aversion.2 The work of Crawford and Pendakur (2013), who
propose finding the smallest partition of people into preference types such that each
1Formally, there might be some types of preferences among women which are also unique. How-
ever, under the null hypothesis that both populations have the same types, the most conservative
forecast is that there are some preference types among men which are not present among women.
2Note that this measure is not complete. The method may return people who are not comparable
in terms of risk aversion. However, the measure can be completed by assuming that incomparable
people are revealed different.
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group’s decisions do not violate GARP, is closest to our approach. Using observa-
tions of the demand for dairy in a cross-section of the Danish population, they find
that there are up to 12 separate preference types in the population. An important
difference between their approach and ours is that we explicitly address the possibil-
ity of behavior that is not perfectly rational. This is important since, in experimental
settings, subjects routinely violate the weak axiom of revealed preferences (Sippel,
1997). It can also be shown that Crawford and Pendakur (2013) provide a lower
bound for the degree of heterogeneity, because rational behavior is confounded with
the choice sets’ inability to reveal violations of rational behavior. Indeed, we use
Crawford and Pendakur’s (2013) method in the random sample of Dutch subjects
by treating each separate budget as if it was a unique individual observation. This
sample contains 29,550 (25× 1182) different observations. We find that these 29,550
budgets can be grouped into only 11 types. Given that we observe that almost 40
percent of the population have a CCEI below 0.9, it is clear that some of the types
must include budgets where the GARP cannot fail.3
Our research fits in with the larger literature on diversity (Weitzman, 1992; Pat-
tanaik and Xu, 2000; Nehring and Puppe, 2002), which has tasked itself with ax-
iomatizing the measurement of diversity. Weitzman (1992) and Nehring and Puppe
(2002) take cardinal measure(s) of difference across individuals or alternatives as a
starting point. While the revealed different relation can be used to construct a dis-
tance function, its appeal lies in the fact that it is an ordinal summary of differences.
We consider this to be a necessary first step in exploring diversity as revealed by
individual choices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
revealed difference approach to heterogeneity. Section 3 describes the data we use
and presents our results. Section 4 discusses alternative measures of heterogeneity,
alternative axioms of rationality and alternative consumption contexts. Section 5
concludes the paper.
3Our approach takes advantage of a richer data set. Our method can be thought as a natural
extension of Crawford and Pendakur’s (2013) approach.
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2. Preliminaries
In this section we provide the definitions that are necessary for formally defining
the revealed different relation and showing when it can be used to elicit differences
in the preferences of agents. First, we define the revealed different relation in general
and provide the conditions under which two subjects’s being revealed different shows
that they do have different preferences. Second, we specify the definitions of ratio-
nality that we use in the analysis. Third, we describe the measures we use for the
distance from rationality. Finally, we discuss how to classify people into preference
types using the revealed different relation.
Let E = {xi, pi}Ni=1 be a consumption experiment, where xi ∈ RL+ are con-
sumption bundles chosen at prices pi ∈ RL++, and let E denote the set of all consump-
tion experiments. Note that prices define the budget Bi = {x : pix ≤ pixi}. Let us
assume that every E is generated by a complete preference relation R over RL+. Let
ρ : E → [0, 1] be a distance from rationality, where ρ(E) = 0 if and only if there
is a complete and transitive relation that rationalizes E. We remark that the notion
of rationality can include requirements other than completeness and transitivity of
preferences. Let D = {E1, E2, . . . , En}, Ei ∈ E be a set of consumption experiments.
2.1. The Revealed Different Relation
In this section we make explicit the meaning that two consumption experiments
are revealed different. Additionally, we show the conditions under which two con-
sumption experiments will be revealed different only if they are generated by two
different underlying preference relations.
Two consumption experiments are revealed different if jointly they are further
from rationality than each of them taken separately:
RDε(Er, Es) =
 1, if ρ(Er ∪ Es)−max{ρ(Er); ρ(Es)} > ε0, otherwise.
Let us illustrate the mechanics of the RDε using a simple example. Assume we
have two consumption experiments, each one of them consisting of only one choice:
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E1 = {((1, .75), (.25, 1))} and E2 = {((2, .5), (1, .5))}. Each of the experiments is
trivially rational, however, the joint experiment violates the Weak Axiom of Re-
vealed Preferences. That is, the joint decisions are more distant to rationality than
individual choices.
Even if all choices are generated by the same underlying preferences, it is possible
to observe that ρ(Er ∪ Es) > 0 for choices r and s due to the fact that we only
observe an estimate of the “underlying” distance from rationality. For instance, two
experiments in the previous paragraph could be generated by the same (not fully
rational) preference relation. For that reason, we introduce a precision parameter
(ε) such that ρ(Er ∪Es)−max{ρ(Er); ρ(Es)} > ε as a way to reduce the likelihood
of false positives. Note that the precision of this estimate depends on the desired
power of the test, i.e. the number of observations per person.
Observation 1. For every Er, Es ∈ E, RDε(Er, Es) satisfies the following properties:
– RDε(Er, Er) = 0
– RDε(Er, Es) ≥ 0
– RDε(Er, Es) = RDε(Es, Er).
Observation 1 shows that RDε is a distance function.
4 This is important since
Weitzman (1992) shows that if differences between species can be represented by a
distance function, it is always possible to construct a value function that represents
the costs of losing a species. Note that in the current paper we do not address
the issue of cardinal measures of diversity. However, Observation 1 shows that it is
possible to use RDε to construct a cardinal measure of diversity.
Let us now show that there is always such measurement error such that RDε
returns one only if two consumption experiments are generated by different preference
relations. This is important, because it shows that for any data set there is a RDε
4We use the distance function in the sense introduced by Weitzman (1992), that is for every
x, y, the following are true if d is a distance function d(x, y) ≥ 0; d(x, x) = 0; d(x, y) = d(y, x).
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that do not produce false positives. Let E(R) ⊆ E denote the space of consumption
experiments generated by R.
Observation 2. For every Er, Es ∈ E, there is a ε such that RDε(Er, Es) = 1 only
if Er and Es are generated by different preference relations.
Proof. Let Rr be the complete preference relation. Let Er be a finite consumption
experiment generated by Rr, i.e. Er ∈ E(Rr). Let εr = supEr⊂E∈E(Rr) |ρ(E)− ρ(Er)|.
Since ρ is bounded, there is a finite supremum εr ≤ 1. Similarly we can define εs.
Let ε = max{εr, εs}. Assume on the contrary that Er and Es are generated by
the same preference relation and RDε(Er, Es) = 1. This implies that ρ(Er ∪ Es) −
min{ρ(Er), ρ(Es)} > ε. Without loss of generality assume that ρ(Er) ≤ ρ(Es), then
ρ(Er∪Es)−ρ(Er) > εr. This implies a contradiction, because εr ≥ ρ(Er∪Es)−ρ(Er)
(implied by Er ∪ Es ∈ E(Rr)).
Observation 2 shows that there always is a precision level ε such that two con-
sumption experiments are revealed different only if they are generated by different
preference relations. Note that the observation establishes that preferences are re-
vealed different by the data, only if they are generated by different preference rela-
tions; it does not claim the reverse. This implies that RDε tends to underestimate
heterogeneity.
A distance function ρ is monotone if ρ(E) increases as new budgets are added
to the consumption experiment E, i.e. E ⊆ E ′ implies ρ(E) ≤ ρ(E ′). Let ρ(R)
be the distance from rationality of the preference relation, that is the distance from
rationality of one of all possible consumption experiments. The following observation
allows us to use RD0 instead of RDε:
Observation 3. If ρ is monotone and for every E ∈ D, ρ(E) = ρ(R), then
RD0(Er, Es) = 1 only if Er and Es are generated by different preference relations.
The proof of this is straightforward and, therefore, it is omitted. We have to as-
sume that the observed distance from rationality is equal to the underlying preference
relation’s distance from rationality. This assumption implies that the consumption
experiment is powerful enough to elicit the real distance from rationality. However,
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even under this assumption this cannot be true unless we assume distance from
rationality to be monotone function.
2.2. Axioms of Revealed Preferences
Because the revealed different relation is defined with respect to a distance from
rationality and distance from rationality in turn depends on the definition of ratio-
nality, we now state the axioms that specify the definitions of rationality that we use
for the analysis.
For a given e ∈ [0, 1], define the revealed preference relation as xiR(e)xj if pixj ≤
epixi and the strict preference relation as xiP (e)xj if pixj < epixi. Let T (e) denote
the transitive closure of R(e).
Definition 1. A consumption experiment E = {xi, pi}Ni=1 satisfies the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if xiT (1)xj implies not xjP (1)xi.
Afriat (1967) showed that a consumption experiment satisfies GARP5 if and only
if there exists a nonsatiated and continuous utility function that represents R(1).
Hence, GARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete
and transitive preference relation that rationalizes the consumption experiment. This
justifies using GARP as our main definition of rationality.
2.3. Measures of Rationality
Recall that to define RDε, we need to specify the distance from rationality. We
introduce the following measures of rationality: the Critical Cost Effieciency Index
(CCEI) (Afriat, 1973), the Money Pump Index (MPI) (Echenique et al., 2011) and
Houtman-Maks Index (HMI) (Houtman and Maks, 1985).
Definition 2. The Critical Cost to Efficiency Index (CCEI) is the maximum
e ∈ [0, 1] such that R(e) is consistent with GARP.
5GARP is introduced by Varian (1982), while Afriat (1967) refers to an equivalent condition
called cyclical consistency.
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The value 1 - CCEI can be interpreted as the share of income a person is willing
to waste to behave irrationally. Note that a subject who is rational has a CCEI of 1.
Importantly, Afriat (1973) showed that e is the CCEI of a consumption experiment if
and only if there exists a nonsatiated and continuous utility function that represents
R(e). In this setup, ρ = 1−e, and therefore larger values of ρ mean greater distances
from rationality. The CCEI is monotone in the sense that it cannot increase as bud-
gets are added to the consumption experiment. Hence, the corresponding distance
from rationality (ρ) is monotone (but increasing) as well.
The second distance function we use is the MPI. Let xi1 , xi2 , . . . , xik be the
sequence that violates GARP, i.e., xijR(1)xij+1 for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and
xikP (1)xi1 . The money pump of the sequence is defined as mp =
∑
j=1:k p
ij(xij −
xij+1), where ik+1 = i1. The relative money pump is defined as the money pump
divided by the total income in the chain (rmp =
∑
j=1:k p
ij (xij−xij+1 )∑
j=1:k p
ijxij
).
Definition 3. The Money Pump Index (MPI) is the median (or the mean)
relative money pump over all sequences that violate GARP.
The third index is HMI, originally it is defined as the maximum subset of data that
is consisted with GARP. However, for the sake of our method we need to redefine
it as the ratio of the maximum subset of data that satisfies GARP to the size of
consumption experiment.
Definition 4. The Houtman-Maks Index (HMI) is defined as follows:
HMI =
max
E′⊆E
{|E ′| : E ′ satsisfies GARP }
|E|
Note that of the above mentioned indices, only the CCEI is monotone. Therefore,
it is the only one to which we can formally apply RD0 (see Observation 3). Moreover,
both the MPI and HMI are not feasible to compute (NP) for the general case (L ≥ 3).
We, therefore, use the average money pump methodology from Smeulders et al.
(2013) to approximate the MPI. For the case of HMI we follow Gross and Kaiser
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(1996) since we have linear budgets.6
2.4. How should heterogeneity be measured?
We now discuss how to measure heterogeneity using the revealed different relation.
Pattanaik and Xu (2000) proposed a measure of freedom of choice based on
the “similarity” of the alternatives available in different choice sets. The revealed
similar and revealed different relations are complements of each other. According to
Pattanaik and Xu (2000), the diversity of a set is determined by the smallest partition
of alternatives into homogeneous disjoint subsets. A set is said to be homogeneous if
none of its elements are different from each other (or, alternatively, any two elements
of the set are similar). Pattanaik and Xu’s (2000) definition of diversity has a natural
appeal for classifying people into preference types.
We remark that given this definition, there might be two individuals who are not
revealed different from each other but are nevertheless assigned to different preference
types. This can occur if one of these individuals, a, is not revealed different from
any other individual, while the other, b, is revealed different from a third individual,
c. In this case, b and c belong to different preference types, and a can freely be
assigned to either b’s preference type or c’s preference type. This makes it clear that
measurement of the heterogeneity of preferences is akin to the well-studied problem
of graph coloring in graph theory (see Agnarsson and Greenlaw (2006)). We will
now provide the necessary definitions to show the equivalence of the two problems
and to explain how we group preferences into types.
A graph is a tuple G = (V,A) in which V is the set of vertices and A ⊆ {V, V },
where {V, V } is the set of all 2-element subsets of V . Vertices u, v ∈ V are said to
be adjacent if {u, v} ∈ A. Note that we can define the graph that corresponds to
the revealed difference relation as follows: Let G be the set of individuals (i, j, . . .),
and let {i, j} ∈ A if and only if RDε(i, j) = 1. A coloring is a function c : V → N,
such that if {u, v} ∈ A(G) for some u, v ∈ V , then c(u) 6= c(v). This simply means
that none of the two adjacent vertices can have same color. A graph G is said to be
6Note that this works only for two-good case. For the higher dimensional problem one can apply
the Mixed Integer Programming method from Heufer and Hjertstrand (2015).
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k-colorable, if there is a coloring function c : V → {1, 2, . . . , k} – the graph can be
colored using no more than k-colors.
Definition 5. A number χ(G) is said to be chromatic number of the graph if G
is χ(G)-colorable and there is no k < χ(G) such that G is k-colorable.
The chromatic number of a graph is the minimum number of colors required for
a graph coloring – in our context this would specify the minimum amount of types to
cover all the population. Importantly, the chromatic number is unique, and therefore
the measure of diversity is always well-defined. Note that coloring in the context
of revealed differences implies, that there is no couple of consumption experiments
which are revealed different and belong to the same type. As we already mentioned
this has a direct connection to the Pattanaik and Xu (2000) measure of the freedom
of choice – let graph be defined over alternatives and two vertices being adjacent if
alternatives are not similar. Then, the minimum amount of disjoint homogeneous
sets necessary to cover all space of alternatives would be equal to the chromatic
number of this graph.
It is important to note that while the chromatic number is unique, the actual
coloring of a graph need not be. This can be shown using a simple example. Assume
there is a vertex that is not connected to any other vertex (an isolated vertex); then
this can be colored with an arbitrary color. Hence, an isolated vertex can belong
to any type, and therefore, coloring is not unique. Thus, while we can answer the
question of how many preference types there are, we cannot (uniquely) determine
the composition of the types.
3. Results
In this section, we provide an empirical analysis of heterogeneity using the revealed
different relation. We first discuss the data we use. Second, we determine ε for
RDε according to Observation 2. Third, we use RDε to determine the number of
preference types in the data.
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3.1. Data
We employ the experimental data that uses contingent assets. Let i = 1, . . . , L
denote the states of the world. Then pi ∈ [0; 1]L such that
L∑
i=1
pii = 1 denote the
probability distribution over the states of the world, where pii is the probability that
state of the world i happens. In this case x is the vector of investments in every state
of the world given prices p and xi is paid to the subject if i-th state of the world is
realized.
The analysis is based on the following data sets:
– Choi et al. (2007). The participants are 93 undergraduates and staff members
from the University of California – Berkeley. Each subject faced 50 different
budgets with two risky assets that obtained with probabilities 1
2
, 1
3
, or 2
3
. The
prices of the assets were assigned randomly.
– Choi et al. (2014). The participants are a random sample of 1182 Dutch adults.
Each participant faced 25 budgets with two risky assets that obtained with
equal probability. The prices of the assets were assigned randomly.
3.2. Testing Assumptions
For the revealed different relation to elicit real differences in preferences we have
to make two assumptions: (i) distance from rationality converges to some “true” dis-
tance from rationality, and (ii) observed distances from rationality are “close enough”
to the “real” distance from rationality.
While assumption (i) has to be taken for granted, assumption (ii) can be tested.
Recall that the data in Choi et al. (2014) has 25 budgets per subject, and for the
unions of two consumption experiments we obtain 50 budgets per pair. Therefore,
using Choi et al.’s (2007) data (which has 50 budgets per subject), we can estimate
the changes in the distance from rationality resulting from increasing the number
of budget from 25 to 50 (ε). Note however, that these data sets sample different
populations. Choi et al. (2007) is an experiment with undergraduate students from
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Berkeley, while Choi et al. (2014) takes the sample of Dutch adults.7
This is necessary to control for possible false positive results in which two con-
sumption experiments generated by the same underlying preference relation appear
to be revealed different.
For this purpose, we bootstrap 100 samples of 25 budgets for each subject and
measure the distance from rationality using these sub-experiments. Then we com-
pare the distances from rationality obtained from the bootstrapped sub-experiments
using 25 budgets to the distances from rationality obtained from the consumption
experiment with 50 budgets. Since the consumption experiments are generated using
the data from the same subjects, they are generated by the same underlying prefer-
ence relation. Hence, the distance from rationality in the experiment with 50 budgets
minus the distance from rationality in the experiment with 25 budgets characterizes
the value of ε that is needed to eliminate the possibility of a subject being revealed
different from him- or herself. Figure 1 shows the distribution of changes in distance
from rationality between 25 and 50 budgets for all indices.
[Figure 1 about here.]
We construct RDε relations with ε equal to 0, to the median change in the
distance from rationality, and to the 95th percentile of the empirical distribution of
the change in the distance from rationality. Note that Figure 1 shows that the indices
behave differently. In particular, the CCEI is, by definition, monotone and stabilizes
at quite small levels of ε. While the MPI is not monotone, the changes are quite
small. This is due to the fact that the method we use estimates the median MPI for
all cycles and hence for a large enough number of budgets adding more data will not
shift the median if preferences are similar. Finally, the HMI is not monotone and it
does not stabilize. It is, therefore, difficult to perform the proposed analysis using
HMI since we would have to account for quite a large ε. This would significantly
reduce the ability of our method to find out the differences if they are present.
7Choi et al. (2014) show that the distribution of the CCEI is larger in the Berkeley sample than
in the Dutch population. That is subjects in the Dutch sample are further from rationality.
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[Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 shows the values of ε we use in the analysis. To simplify notation, we use
RD0 to denote the relation that does not allow for error, RDM to denote the relation
that uses the median change in distance from rationality, and RD95CI to denote the
relation that uses the 95th percentile of the empirical distribution of the change in
distance from rationality.
3.3. The Revealed Different Relation
This section presents basic information about the revealed different relation. The
richness of the revealed different relation can be appreciated through Figure 2. It
shows the density of the relation for a random sample of 100 subjects and an example
of the coloring of the RD relation.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Table 2 presents the basic statistics for the revealed different relation. The average
number of people a subject is different from is 695 (s.d. 237), with a minimum of 20
and a maximum of 1176 (numbers provided use RD0 according to CCEI).
[Table 2 about here.]
We want to answer the following questions with our analysis: first, whether het-
erogeneity in terms of preferences is present in the data, and how many types there
are; second, whether heterogeneity can be explained by some observable characteris-
tics (demographic data) or is mostly idiosyncratic; and third, how our method should
be used to reveal differences across groups – in particular, differences by gender. Note
that the method we construct allows us not only to answer the question of whether
groups have different types of preferences, but also to compare the groups on the
basis of how heterogeneous they are.
As mentioned above, we use the data from Choi et al. (2014) for this purpose.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample. The sample has a majority of
men, people who are older than 50 years of age, people who are salaried, and people
who are in a stable relationship.
[Table 3 about here.]
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3.3.1. Are Preferences Different?
Figure 3 shows the number of different preference types as a function of the popu-
lation size. These estimates are obtained by random sampling subsets of individuals
and calculating the chromatic numbers for those sets based on the RDε relation.
The RDε relation is defined in terms of the CCEI, MPI and HMI. Panel (a) shows
the results using the CCEI, Panel (b) shows the results using the MPI and Panel
(c) shows the results using HMI. Solid lines are the (mean) number of types for the
corresponding group, and dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals for the
number of types given a population size. However, due to the tightness of confidence
intervals in this case they are hardly visible. Henceforth, we use 400 bootstrapped
samples per population size. In both cases, the higher we set ε, the fewer the types
that are revealed.
We observe that the (mean) number of preference types in a population of 1000
individuals is 90 according to the CCEI, 77 according to the MPI and 166 according
to HMI. In the population at large (1,182 people), we find that there are 131 types if
we use the CCEI to define RD0, there are 116 types if we use the MPI to define RD0
and 248 types if we use HMI to define RD0. If we restrict the definition of revealed
difference to RDM , then the number of types is 90 for the CCEI, 116 for the MPI
and 176 for HMI. If we restrict the definition of revealed difference to RD95CI , then
the number of types is 35 for the CCEI, 17 for the MPI and 5 for HMI. This shows
that there is a large degree of heterogeneity in the data regardless of the measure
used for distance from rationality. Note that there are fewer types according to the
MPI compared to the CCEI. This can be explained by the fact that the MPI is
not a monotone measure of distance from rationality. For the case of the HMI, the
number of types is dramatically reduced. This is due to the large measurement error
associated with this measure.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 suggests that the total number of groups in the population is finite.
We do not observe a linear relationship between population size and the number
of groups. Given that the minimum size of a group is one, we would expect that
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the number of groups eventually converges. Note, however, that the answer to the
question of how many types there are is complicated by measurement error. Figure 3
demonstrates that making the revealed different relation stricter leads to a reduction
in the number of types in the population. One implication is that heterogeneity is
likely to be underestimated due to the fact that all consumption experiments are
finite and therefore unable to detect some differences (see Observation 2). More
importantly, erroneous assumptions regarding rationality are likely to reduce the
measured level of heterogeneity. We will discuss this issue more extensively below.
Figure 1 shows a significant portion of the population undergoing very large
changes in their CCEIs as we move from 25 to 50 budgets. This suggests that esti-
mates of ε based on means will likely be biased upwards. That is, the ε needed to
statistically reject the null hypothesis of no difference in preferences is likely over-
estimated. Figure 3 illustrates this. The estimated number of groups based on the
median change in CCEI is much larger than the estimates based on the 95% per-
centile of the change in CCEI. However, using this very strict threshold, we still find
a large number of types in the population. We can then conclude that there is a high
degree of heterogeneity in the data.
3.3.2. What Can Explain Heterogeneity?
To investigate whether the observed level of heterogeneity in the data is due to
observed individual characteristics, we conduct regression analysis on the revealed
different relation on the characteristics of the individuals in a pair. Table 4 presents
a linear probability model on a variable that equals 1 if individuals i and j are
revealed different and 0 if they are not. The main statistic of interest is the portion
of the variance of the revealed different relation that can be explained by differences
in individual characteristics. Given that there are 1,182 subjects, we have 1,397,124
such comparisons. All the regressions cluster errors at the i level and all regressions
include fixed effects on the i and j subject.
The first four columns in Table 4 show estimates for the case in which the re-
vealed different relation is calculated using Afriat’s CCEI. The first column shows a
regression in which only fixed effects for each member of the pair are included. Fixed
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effects capture any individual differences across individuals. They capture about 33
percent of the variance in the revealed different relation. This means that two-thirds
of the variance in the relation cannot be explained by individual differences. The
next regressions then include characteristics of the pair. We observe in the second
column that adding characteristics of the pair adds little to the proportion of the
variance explained. This finding holds regardless of how strict the definition of the
revealed different relation is. This suggests that there other factors that are par-
ticular to the pair that explain the differences in preferences. The fifth and sixth
column reproduce the analysis using the MPI. The last three columns present the
corresponding regressions using the HMI. We note that the results using the HMI are
unstable, contradicting results using either the CCEI or the MPI. This is likely due
to the fact that the HMI does not stabilize as more information is added and suggests
caution in using measures of distance from rationality that are not monotone.
Table 4 allows us to take a look at differences in preferences across and within
subpopulations. We observe that a pair of males are more likely to be different than
a mixed gender pair and that a pair of females are less likely to be different than
a mixed gender pair. This result is consistent for all ε for the RDε computed for
CCEI and MPI. Regarding age differences, we do not observe a consistent pattern
across definitions and assumptions. Finally, differences across other characteristics
are relatively small and not always consistent. Table 5 reproduces these results using
logit regressions instead of linear regressions. This demonstrate that the results are
not due to parametric assumptions made in the regression analysis.
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
3.3.3. Which Groups Are Different?
We have already shown evidence regarding the amount of heterogeneity within
and between subpopulations. We now investigate whether there are differences across
groups and whether there are groups with more diverse preferences.
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To answer the first question, we check whether the number of groups in the
population as a whole is larger than the number of groups in its constituent subpop-
ulations. We do this because for an additional group to appear in the population
as a whole, there must exist a member of one of the subpopulations who is revealed
different than some person in each of the groups of the other subpopulations. That
is, there must be a person in one subpopulation who cannot be included in any of the
existing groups in other subpopulations. To answer the second question, we simply
look at the number of groups of different subpopulations. Populations that are more
heterogeneous are expected to be divided into more groups.
Since the number of groups tends to be larger in larger populations, we need to
study the distribution of types across populations holding constant the sample size
of individuals used in the estimation. This can be done by taking random samples
of equal size from the population of interest (males, females, mixed gender). We
present results for samples sizes ranging from 50 to 500.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Figure 4 shows the number of types for males, females, and the population at
large. The graphs are presented by the measure of rationality we use (CCEI, MPI
or HMI) and the value of ε. Solid lines are the (mean) number of types for the
corresponding group and dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals for the
number of types given a population size.
Figure 4 shows two main findings. First, males and females have different prefer-
ences. We can conclude this from the fact that the number of types in the population
at large is larger than the number of types in the two mono-gender samples (54.6 for
the mixed gender group, 48.5 for the males-only group, and 45.8 for the females-only
group). In other words, there are types of preferences that are specific to males and
females. Second, males are more heterogeneous than females. We can infer this from
the fact that the number of types in the males-only group is greater than the number
of types in the females-only group (48.5 for the males-only group and 45.8 for the
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females-only group).8
We verify the existence of gender differences in risk preferences by comparing
their propensity to deviate from asset allocations that give equal payments in all
of the states of the world. Figure 5 shows the average absolute deviation from
equal payments for male and female subjects.9 The average deviation of males is
significantly different from that of females (0.1979 vs. 0.1763, t-test = 3.1138, p-
value = 0.0019). This comparison is valid since budgets were randomly assigned to
subjects. Any systematic difference in asset allocation must be due to difference in
risk attitudes. While reassuring, this exercise also illustrates an advantage of our
method. The observed difference in asset allocations might be due to the existence
of different preference types among male and female subjects or to the fact that some
preference types are over-represented in these populations. Our method shows that
there are different preference types in these populations. Note that this result cannot
be found using the HMI×RD95CI . In this case, the measurement error is too large
to detect differences across populations.
[Figure 5 about here.]
4. Discussion
4.1. Robustness
We complement our analysis by exploring two questions: (1) How does the re-
vealed difference relation change as stricter versions of rationality are considered? and
(2) Are the differences we obtain dependent on the particular context of contingent
assets? To answer the first question, we analyze the revealed difference relation with
the added assumption that subjects respect first-order and second-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD, SOSD). This extension is natural since most models of behavior
8The numbers presented in this paragraph are for RD0 based on the CCEI at the group size
500. However, the difference is robust to different values of ε and to using the MPI instead of the
CCEI.
9The formula is 1K
∑i=K
i=1 | xx+y − 12 | where x and y is the allocations in each one of the assets
and K is the number of budgets faced by the subject.
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under risk, neoclassical or not, assume FOSD. This analysis is presented in detail
in the Appendix. To answer the second question, we analyze the data in Castillo
and Freer (2016) using revealed difference relation (see Appendix). These data used
budgets defined over goods, not contingent assets.10
Our analysis produce two clear results. First, the revealed difference relation is
sensitive to the validity of the assumptions on rationality. Assumptions like FOSD,
which is not supported in these data, hampers our ability to detect heterogeneity
across groups. This exercise shows that the measurement of the heterogeneity of
preferences is intimately related to the assumptions made about behavior. Wrong,
parametric or non-parametric assumptions about preferences will lead to an underes-
timation of the number of preference types. This also illustrates the general fact that
the further are agents from rationality the harder it is to identify the heterogeneity
of preferences.11 The second results is that gender difference in heterogeneity we
detected are present in the context of goods as well. This is remarkable given that
the data set is much smaller (63 subjects in total).
4.2. Alternative ways to group people
Recently, Crawford and Pendakur (2013) have proposed using revealed preference
methods to determine the number of different preference types in a population. The
intuition behind their approach is similar to the intuition behind ours, with the
difference that they use cross-sectional data with one observation per person. A
potential shortcoming of using cross-sectional data to group people into preference
types is that the method cannot distinguish between being mutually consistent and
not being comparable. That is, a person whose budget sets are contained in the
budget sets of another person cannot be revealed different from this person without
invoking stronger preference assumptions such as homotheticity. This could generate
a serious downward bias on the amount of heterogeneity whenever the number of
10The goods are: cash, Barnes and Noble gift card, and Mason Money. The last one is the
internal monetary system which can be used for any cafes and restaurants on campus.
11The same idea is included in the economic significance index by Heufer (2014), especially in
the empirical analysis using the index.
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goods a person considers is small.
We test whether Crawford and Pendakur’s (2013) estimate of heterogeneity might
be biased downwards when the set of goods is small. To do this, we consider each
budget in our data as if it were a unique individual observation and calculate the
number of types using Crawford and Pendakur’s (2013) method. We find that a
total sample of 29, 550 (25× 1182) can be classified into 11 different types according
to their method. Note, however, that these results might not be reliable due to the
fact that many subjects are not perfectly rational in contradiction with the method’s
assumptions. However, the method requires restricting the analysis to situations that
make decisions across individuals comparable.
5. Conclusions
We use the revealed preference approach to analyze the heterogeneity of prefer-
ences. We define two individuals to be revealed different if their joint decisions are
further from rationality than each of their individual decisions taken separately. The
method is useful for analyzing the structure of preferences and assessing the effect
of stricter definitions of rationality on the measured heterogeneity of preferences.
Using a random sample of Dutch adults, we find that men possess more heteroge-
neous preferences than women. We also find that stricter definitions of rationality
decrease the level of heterogeneity observed in the data. This suggests there is a
trade-off between precision in estimates and revealed heterogeneity in preferences in
the parametric approach. We show that our results are robust to using alternative
definitions of distance from rationality and robust across different contexts. Our
method shows that revealed preference analysis can be a useful tool for analyzing
differences in preferences across individuals.
Appendix
A: Additional Axioms
We show that adding more unfeasible assumptions is costly in terms of hetero-
geneity. In the case of contingent assets, every element of x ∈ RL+ corresponds to
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the payoff in every state of the world. Let pi ∈ [0; 1]L such that
L∑
i=1
pii = 1 denote the
probability distribution over the states of the world, where pii is the probability that
state of the world i happens. Denote by Fx(ξ) the cumulative distribution function
that corresponds to the lottery x – the probability that x would pay no more than ξ.
For every x, y ∈ RL+ let ξi ∈ {x1, . . . , xL}∪{y1, . . . , yL} and assume that all ξi are or-
dered in the increasing order. Now we can define First Order Stochastic Dominance
and Second Order Stochastic Dominance relations by
x ≥FSD y if Fx(ξi) ≤ Fy(ξi) for all ξi
and
x ≥SSD y if
l∑
i=1
Fx(ξ
i)[ξi+1 − ξi] ≤
l∑
i=1
Fy(ξ
i)[ξi+1 − ξi] for all l < n
A preference relation R satisfies First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD) if ≥FSD⊆
R and Second Order Stochastic Dominance (SOSD) if≥SSD⊆ R. Note that≥FSD⊆≥SSD
therefore every preference relation that satisfies SOSD satisfies FOSD as well. Fur-
ther we present the revealed preference axioms that guarantee existence of complete,
transitive preference relation that satisfies FOSD (FSD-GARP) and that guaran-
tees existence of complete, transitive preference relation that satisfies SOSD (SSD-
GARP). These axioms has been introduced by Heufer (2014) who also shows that
they are equivalent to the existence of corresponding complete preference relation.
Denote by RFSD(e) = R(e)∪ ≥FSD and by TFSD(e) denote the transitive closure
of RFSD(e). Denote by
PFSD(e) =
{
(x, y) : xTFSD(e)z(P (e)∪ ≥FSD)z′TFSD(e)y for some z, z′ ∈ RL+
}
Similar definitions can be introduced for SOSD we will refer to them just changing
the subscript. Let σl(x) be the l-th permutation of x and by L! the factorial of L.
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Denote by
σ(E) = {y : y = σl(xi) for some i = 1, . . . , n; l = 1, . . . , L!}
Definition 6. A consumption experiment E = {xi, pi}Ni=1 satisfies the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference and First Order Stochastic Dominant
(FSD-GARP) if siTFSD(1)s
j implies not sjPFSD(1)s
i for every si, sj ∈ σ(E).
Further we introduce the similar condition for SSD-GARP. Let x ∼E y if the
expected payoffs of x and y are equal, i.e. pix = piy. Note that in the case of FSD-
GARP it is necessary to check GARP for every permutation of the chosen points, for
the SSD-GARP we need to check GARP for the limit points of the set of points that
weakly SOSD at least one of the chosen point given that they have same expected
value. Further we formally define this set of points.
M(x, {i1}) =
{
y ∈ RL+ : y = arg max
y′(≥SSD∩∼E)x
y′i1
}
Now take a sequence of indices {ij}nj=1, n ≤ L− 1, 1 ≤ ij ≤ L, then
M(x, {i1}nj=1) =
{
y ∈ RL+ : y = arg max
y′∈M(x,{i1}n−1j=1 )
y′in
}
Let Mˆ(x) denotes the union for all M(x, {i1}nj=1) for every permutation of indices
from 1 to L and
τ(E) = {y ∈ RL+ : y ∈ Mˆ(xi) for some i = 1, . . . , n}
that is that Mˆ(xi) for every chosen point.
Definition 7. A consumption experiment E = {xi, pi}Ni=1 satisfies the Generalized
Axiom of Revealed Preference and Second Order Stochastic Dominant
(SSD-GARP) if siTSSD(1)s
j implies not sjPSSD(1)s
i for every si, sj ∈ τ(E).
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We do similar calibration procedure to determine the correct median and confi-
dence interval ε for the FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP. However, in this case we use
only the 47 subjects in Choi et al. (2007) symmetric treatment (pi = (1
2
, 1
2
)). Table 6
presents the measurement errors obtained from the calibration procedure. We note
that these estimates imply a more restrictive notion of heterogeneity.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
Table 7 presents the summary statistics for RD0, RDM and RD95CI using GARP,
FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP. Figure 6 presents the results for the amount of types
obtained using GARP, FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP. The amount of types obtained
using GARP, FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP for the whole sample (1182 people) are
131, 85 and 30. We see that additional restriction on the definition of rationality
lead to a reduction in the measured amount of hetorogeneity.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figure 7 presents the results for males and females. Using FSD-GARP, i.e. consis-
tency with first-order stochastic dominance, we cannot reject that males and females
are equally heterogeneous. The same holds if we use SSD-GARP. Note that this
simple exercise shows us that adding an unfeasible assumption is costly in terms of
measuring heterogeneity, since the different preferences would be hidden by the large
error terms.
[Figure 7 about here.]
B: Preferences over Consumption Goods
We use the data from Castillo and Freer (2016) who conduct an experiment using
real consumption goods. In the experiment, subjects allocate an endowment among
three goods: Cash, Barnes and Noble gift card and Mason Money. Barnes and
Noble is book distributor and stands for necessities since textbooks are a required
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expenditure for students. Mason Money is George Mason internal monetary system
that can be used at any on-campus restaurant, therefore, it stands for food spending.
The commodities are chosen as to minimize the transaction costs of consumption.
The unit of measurement of each commodity is $1. Subjects are asked to allocated a
100 tokens between the above described goods facing prices that are denominated in
tokens per dollar. Each subject faces 30 decision problems, one of which is chosen at
random to be implemented. The experiment was conducted with 64 George Mason
undergraduates of whom 35 are female.
Since we do not have an additional experiment to calibrate the measurement
error in the RD relation, we restrict the analysis to the RDε relation. Due to the
robustness of the results using the CCEI only, we only present the results using this
index. Table 8 presents the amount of types found in our experiments.
[Table 8 about here.]
We use the same methodology as in the paper to construct measures of number
of types per sample size. Since the total number of men is 28, we estimate these
numbers for populations ranging from 5 to 25.
[Figure 8 about here.]
Figure 8 presents the results. The results are similar to those using the data from
Choi et al. (2014). Males and females have different preferences and males have more
preference types than females.
References
Afriat, S.N., 1967. The construction of utility functions from expenditure data.
International Economic Review 8, 67–77.
Afriat, S.N., 1973. On a system of inequalities in demand analysis: an extension of
the classical method. International Economic Review , 460–472.
26
Agnarsson, G., Greenlaw, R., 2006. Graph Theory: Modeling, applications, and
algorithms. Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Castillo, M., Freer, M., 2016. A revealed preference test of quasi-linear preferences.
Working Paper .
Choi, S., Fisman, R., Gale, D., Kariv, S., 2007. Consistency and heterogeneity of
individual behavior under uncertainty. American Economic Review 97, 1921–1938.
Choi, S., Kariv, S., Mueller, W., Silverman, D., 2014. Who Is (More) Rational?
American Economic Review 104, 1518–1550.
Crawford, I., Pendakur, K., 2013. How many types are there? Economic Journal
123, 77–95.
Echenique, F., Lee, S., Shum, M., 2011. The Money Pump as a Measure of Revealed
Preference Violations. Journal of Political Economy 119, 1201–1223.
Gross, J., 1995. Testing data for consistency with revealed preference. Review of
Economics and Statistics 77, 701–710.
Gross, J., Kaiser, D., 1996. Two simple algorithms for generating a subset of data
consistent with warp and other binary relations. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 14, 251–255.
Heufer, J., 2014. Nonparametric comparative revealed risk aversion. Journal of
Economic Theory 153, 569–616.
Heufer, J., Hjertstrand, P., 2015. Consistent subsets: Computationally feasible meth-
ods to compute the houtman–maks-index. Economics Letters 128, 87–89.
Houtman, M., Maks, J., 1985. Determining all maximal data subsets consistent with
revealed preference. Kwantitatieve Methoden 19, 89–104.
Nehring, K., Puppe, C., 2002. A theory of diversity. Econometrica 70, 1155–1198.
27
Pattanaik, P.K., Xu, Y., 2000. On diversity and freedom of choice. Mathematical
Social Sciences 40, 123–130.
Sippel, R., 1997. Experiment on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour. Economic
Journal 107, 1431–1444.
Smeulders, B., Cherchye, L., Spieksma, F.C., De Rock, B., 2013. The money pump
as a measure of revealed preference violations: A comment. Journal of Political
Economy 121, 1248–1258.
Varian, H.R., 1982. The nonparametric approach to demand analysis. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society , 945–973.
Weitzman, M.L., 1992. On diversity. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 363–405.
28
Figures
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
CCEI
F
re
q
u
en
cy
CCEI
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
MPI
F
re
q
u
en
cy
MPI
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
HMI
F
re
q
u
en
cy
HMI
(a) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (b) Money Pump Index (c) Houtman-Maks Index
Figure 1: Relative change in distance from rationality (using Choi et al. (2007) data): changing the
number of budgets from 25 to 50.
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Figure 2: Graph of the revealed different relation
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(a) Critical Cost Efficiency Index (b) Money Pump Index (c) Houtman-Maks Index
Figure 3: Number of types in the revealed different relation for different measures of distance from
rationality and levels of ε
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Figure 4: Number of types in the revealed different relation for mixed gender, males-only and
females-only sub-samples
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Figure 5: Distributions of mean absolute deviations from 50-50 allocation.
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Figure 6: Number in revealed different relation for GARP, FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP and differ-
ent levels of ε
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Figure 7: Number of types in the revealed different relation for mixed gender, males-only and
females-only sub-samples
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Figure 8: Number of types in the revealed different relation for mixed gender, males-only and
females-only sub-samples in Castillo and Freer (2016) data
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Tables
Table 1: Median and 95th percentile of change in distance from rationality ε for revealed different
relation.
Median 95th percentile
CCEI .01 .07
MPI 0 .1
HMI .1 .7
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the probability of being revealed different
CCEI
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 0.5879 0.2006 0.1690 0.9949
RDM 0.5402 0.2014 0.0093 0.9873
RD95CI 0.3283 0.1988 0.0000 0.9501
MPI
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 = RDM 0.5282 0.2044 0.0093 0.9882
RD95CI 0.1047 0.1296 0.0000 0.7022
HMI
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 0.7168 0.1716 0.0059 0.9509
RDM 0.5645 0.2165 0.0000 0.8790
RD95CI 0.0048 0.0115 0.0000 0.1701
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the sample of Dutch population from Choi et al. (2014).
Mean Std. Dev.
Females 0.454 0.498
Age :
16-34 0.185 0.389
35-49 0.261 0.440
50-64 0.356 0.479
65+ 0.197 0.397
Education:
Low 0.336 0.472
Medium 0.297 0.457
High 0.364 0.481
Occupation:
Paid work 0.531 0.499
Housework 0.116 0.320
Retired 0.209 0.407
Others 0.144 0.351
Household Composition:
Partner 0.809 0.393
Number of children 0.843 1.126
Income :
0-2499 0.228 0.419
2500-3499 0.255 0.436
3500-4999 0.292 0.455
5000+ 0.225
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Table 4: Explaining differences: yi,j = 1 if i is revealed different than j, 0 otherwise
GARP×CCEI GARP×MPI GARP×HMI
VARIABLES RD0 RD0 RDM RD95CI RD0 = RDM RD95CI RD0 RDM RD95CI
Female−Female -0.580*** -0.274*** -0.340*** -0.391*** -0.058*** 0.296*** 0.322*** -0.009***
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.007] [0.014] [0.014] [0.003]
Male−Male 0.572*** 0.271*** 0.337*** 0.386*** 0.056*** -0.299*** -0.326*** 0.008***
[0.015] [0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.007] [0.014] [0.014] [0.003]
Age > 49 & Age > 49 0.540*** 0.238*** 0.325*** 0.666*** 0.408*** -0.473*** -0.580*** 0.001***
[0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.019] [0.000]
Age ≤ 49 & Age ≤ 49 -0.509*** -0.226*** -0.310*** -0.636*** -0.399*** 0.507*** 0.613*** 0.001***
[0.015] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.019] [0.019] [0.000]
One-level diff. in educ.+ -0.005** 0.000 -0.002 -0.006*** 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]
Two-level diff. in educ.+ -0.015*** -0.001 -0.005** -0.018*** -0.001 -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.001*
[0.004] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.000]
One-level diff. in income+ 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003*** 0.002 0.000
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Two-level diff. in income+ 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.006*** 0.004** 0.000*
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]
Three-level diff. in income+ 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.008* -0.006** 0.007*** 0.004 0.001***
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.000]
Constant 0.712*** 0.755*** 0.271*** 0.381*** 0.681*** 0.358*** 0.271*** 0.101*** 0.003
[0.014] [0.012] [0.010] [0.012] [0.014] [0.005] [0.013] [0.013] [0.003]
i’s fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
j’s fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,397,124
R-squared 0.332 0.332 0.370 0.358 0.335 0.358 0.290 0.381 0.055
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
+ We use variables as described in Table 3. For instance, “three-level difference in income” equals 1 if one subject has an income
in the bracket [0-2499] and the other subject has an income in the bracket [5000+]
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Table 5: Explaining differences (logits): yi,j = 1 if i is revealed different than j, 0 otherwise
GARP×CCEI GARP×MPI GARP×HMI
VARIABLES RD0 RD0 RDM RD95CI RD0 = RDM RD95CI RD0 RDM RD95CI
Female-Female -3.626*** -4.883*** -3.989*** -2.984*** -4.987*** 2.103*** 2.044*** -0.630
[0.123] [0.332] [0.204] [0.128] [1.043] [0.103] [0.091] [0.519]
Male-Male 3.580*** 4.865*** 3.967*** 2.959*** 4.924*** -2.125*** -2.071*** 0.551
[0.122] [0.332] [0.204] [0.128] [1.040] [0.103] [0.092] [0.519]
Age > 49 & Age > 49 3.395*** 4.633*** 3.905*** 4.522*** 8.974*** -2.947*** -3.485*** -0.234
[0.118] [0.334] [0.206] [0.142] [1.070] [0.139] [0.143] [0.677]
Age ≤ 49 & Age ≤ 49 -3.210*** -4.529*** -3.798*** -4.356*** -8.843*** 3.178*** 3.694*** 0.374
[0.119] [0.334] [0.207] [0.145] [1.077] [0.140] [0.144] [0.680]
One-level diff. in educ.+ -0.034** 0.005 -0.014 -0.038*** 0.021 -0.019 -0.017 0.066
[0.014] [0.012] [0.011] [0.015] [0.023] [0.014] [0.012] [0.052]
Two-level diff. in educ.+ -0.096*** -0.002 -0.039* -0.108*** 0.029 -0.072*** -0.064*** 0.155*
[0.025] [0.021] [0.020] [0.026] [0.040] [0.026] [0.023] [0.082]
One-level diff. in income+ 0.018* 0.017 0.019** -0.003 0.014 0.026*** 0.016** 0.056
[0.009] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.016] [0.008] [0.007] [0.045]
Two-level diff. in income+ 0.019 0.028* 0.026* -0.005 0.053** 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.114*
[0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.015] [0.027] [0.011] [0.011] [0.068]
Three-level diff. in income+ 0.012 0.010 0.016 -0.040 0.011 0.059*** 0.046*** 0.250***
[0.024] [0.023] [0.022] [0.026] [0.045] [0.017] [0.016] [0.094]
Constant 1.036*** 1.292*** -1.042*** -0.449*** 1.017*** -0.715*** -1.413*** -2.371*** -5.486***
[0.078] [0.075] [0.070] [0.066] [0.070] [0.130] [0.065] [0.064] [0.353]
i’s fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
j’s fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,397,124 1,397,124 1,382,976 1,387,684 1,397,124 1,373,584 1,397,124 1,322,500 233,289
Pseudo R-squared 0.299 0.299 0.377 0.339 0.301 0.529 0.260 0.304 0.236
Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the individual level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
+ We use variables as described in Table 3. For instance, “three-level difference in income” equals 1 if one subject has an income
in the bracket [0-2499] and the other subject has an income in the bracket [5000+]
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Table 6: Measurement error for FSD-GARP and SSD-GARP
Median 95th percentile
GARP .01 .07
FSD-GARP .004 .19
SSD-GARP .008 .22
42
Table 7: Summary statistics for the probability of being revealed different
GARP
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 0.5879 0.2006 0.1690 0.9949
RDM 0.5402 0.2014 0.0093 0.9873
RD95CI 0.3283 0.1988 0.0000 0.9501
FSD-GARP
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 0.4759 0.1892 0.0034 0.9239
RDM 0.4531 0.1866 0.0017 0.9196
RD95CI 0.0391 0.0631 0.0000 0.3968
SSD-GARP
Type of RD Mean SD Min Max
RD0 0.1609 0.1485 0.0000 0.6244
RDM 0.1453 0.1413 0.0000 0.6091
RD95CI 0.0145 0.0354 0.0000 0.2614
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Table 8: Amount of types in Castillo and Freer (2016) data
Total Males Females
RD0 24 15 14
RDM 23 14 13
RD95CI 13 9 8
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